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This study integrates economic and physical models to estimate the social costs of several commonly 
suggested policies (chemical-use tax and three types of conservation payments) for reducing nitrogen loads to 
the Mississippi River and for controlling hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico. The economic models predict 
farmers’ crop rotations, tillage practices, and participation in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) at more 
than 44,000 Natural Resource Inventory sites in the Upper Mississippi River Basin. The estimated land use 
changes under the four policies are incorporated into a physical model to assess their impact on nitrate-N 
concentrations in the Mississippi River. Results suggest that the fertilizer-use tax is much more cost-effective 
than the three conservation easement policies. Incentive payments for conservation tillage are most cost-
effective among the three conservation easement policies, but can reduce nitrate-N concentrations only to a 
limited level. The potential for incentive payments for corn-soybean rotations is even more limited as an 
instrument for reducing nitrate-N concentrations in the Mississippi River. These payments also impose a 
higher cost to society than payments for conservation tillage. Payments for cropland retirement can be used to 
achieve the largest reduction in nitrate-N concentrations, but also impose the largest cost to society among the 
four policies considered in this paper. Results also suggest that, in contrast to previous studies, the targeted 
fertilizer-use tax reduces the aggregate farm profit loss under the uniform fertilizer-use tax by up to 30 percent. 
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 The productivity of U.S. agriculture has increased dramatically over the past 50 years, due largely to the 
adoption of new technologies and increased chemical use. As a consequence, agricultural runoff has been 
identified as a primary source of water quality problems in surveyed rivers and streams (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency 2002). NO3-N in excessive amounts may cause eutrophication in salty waters, depleting the 
level of dissolved oxygen and harming aquatic ecosystems. When oxygen levels fall below the concentrations 
needed to sustain marine life, a condition known as hypoxia will occur. The Upper Mississippi River Basin 
(UMRB) is under increasing scrutiny as a major source of NO3-N loadings to the Mississippi River, causing 
hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico. Although the UMRB comprises only 15 percent of the drainage area of the 
entire MRB, it contributes more than half of NO3-N discharged to the Gulf of Mexico (Goolsby and Battaglin). 
Numerous federal and state incentive-based programs have been initiated with goals of reducing the 
environmental impact of agricultural production, including the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), 
Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP), and Wetland Reserve Program (WRP). The newly adopted 
Conservation Security Act expands these existing programs and includes provisions for new programs. Ex ante 
analysis of the likely cost effectiveness and environmental efficacy of changes in these programs, or ex post 
assessment of the outcomes of these programs, requires a large scale economic model capable of estimating the 
costs of alternative land uses on spatially heterogeneous land, combined with the capacity to estimate the 
environmental effects of these alternative land uses at the regional scale. It is also important to employ micro-
level data in policy analysis both to achieve consistency with the underlying economic theory on which land 
use (discrete) choice models are based and to capture accurately the significant spatial variability in economic 
and environmental variables (Antle and Capalbo; Hochman and Zilberman; Wu at al.). 
The primary objective of this paper is to develop an empirical framework to estimate the social costs 
of alternative conservation programs (payments for conservation tillage, corn-soybean rotation, and cropland 
retirement) and input-use taxes for reducing NO3-N loads to surface waters within the UMRB and Gulf of 
Mexico. This objective is achieved by integrating a set of econometric models and a physical model (The Soil 
and Water Assessment Tool; SWAT). The econometric models are estimated to predict crop choice, crop 
rotations, tillage practices, and participation in the CRP at more than 44,000 Natural Resource Inventory (NRI) 
sites in the UMRB. Based on the predicted land use changes from the econometric models, SWAT then 
simulates the level of NO3-N concentrations in the Mississippi River. This integrated framework allows 
region-scale policy simulations while incorporating site-specific economic behavior and physical 
characteristics. The primary data sources used in this analysis include the 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997 National 
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Agriculture. 
Our empirical results show that a fertilizer-use tax is much more cost-effective than the three 
conservation easement policies for reducing NO3-N concentrations in the Mississippi River.  However, a 
fertilizer-use tax is much less feasible politically than the easement policies. Among the three easement 
policies considered in this study, the incentive payment for conservation tillage is most cost-effective, but it 
can only reduce nitrate-N concentrations by a limited level. The potential for the incentive payment for corn-
soybean rotations is even more limited as an instrument for reducing NO3-N concentrations. This payment also 
imposes a larger cost to society. The payment for cropland retirement can be used to achieve the largest 
reduction in NO3-N concentrations, but it imposes the highest cost to society among the four policies 
considered in this paper. Results also suggest that, in contrast to previous studies, the targeted fertilizer-use tax 
reduces the aggregate farm profit loss under the uniform fertilizer-use tax by up to 30 percent. 
 
Literature Review 
Much research has focused on the impact of farming practices on nitrate water pollution at the field, farm, or 
watershed levels (e.g., De Roo; Pionke and Urban; Hallberg; Gilliam and Hoyt; Grady). These studies have 
linked nitrate water pollution to land use, nitrogen application rates, crop management practices, and 
hydrologic settings. These studies, however, have not examined how the decisions that led to those cropping 
patterns and farming practices were made. Thus, they cannot be used to assess the effectiveness of alternative 
policies for controlling agricultural pollution. 
The design of policy to encourage adoption of environmentally-friendly farming practices requires 
analysis of adoption decisions. In response, many studies examine factors affecting adoption of specific 
management practices, such as conservation tillage (Ervin and Ervin; Korsching et al.; Williams, Llewelyn, 
and Barnaby; Helms, Bailey, and Glover; Kurkalova, Kling and Zhao; Yiridoe and Weersink), irrigation 
technologies (Caswell and Zilberman), and water quality protection practices (Fuglie and Bosch; Cooper and 
Keim). For example, Cooper and Keim use survey data to estimate payment levels that would be needed to 
induce farmers to adopt alternative water quality protection practices.    
  Other policy instruments proposed for controlling agricultural pollution include input taxes, input 
regulations, ambient taxes, random fines, direct revelation, and type-specific contracts (Griffin and Bromley; 
Shortle and Dunn; Segerson; Xepapadeas; Cabe and Herriges). Instruments that provide flexible incentives 
(such as ambient taxes) can be used to induce first-best control of nonpoint pollution (Segerson), but 
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thus been criticized for high information and/or transactions costs (e.g., Cabe and Herriges; Batie and Ervin). 
This has led some to suggest the use of second best policy instruments for controlling nonpoint pollution 
(Helfand and House; Wu and Babcock). 
A number of empirical studies have modeled the interaction between agricultural production and 
water quality. These studies can be classified into disaggregate models and aggregate models. The disaggregated 
models are site-specific and model micro-unit decisions and their impact on water quality at the farm or 
watershed levels (e.g., Braden et al.; Johnson, Adams, and Perry; Taylor, Adams, and Miller). The aggregate 
models can be further classified into two groups. One group integrates an aggregate economic model (usually a 
regional or national linear programming model) with a physical model to analyze the impact agricultural practices 
and policies on water quality (e.g., Piper, Huang, and Ribaudo; Mapp et al.). The aggregate economic model 
predicts the impact of alternative policies on land allocation and input uses, and the physical model estimates the 
impact of crop production on water quality. The second group of aggregate models examines policy impacts at 
the regional or national level while incorporating site-specific land characteristics (e.g., Wu and Segerson; Wu et 
al.; Wu and Babcock; Antle and Capalbo). This study belongs to the second group, but focuses on an important 
issue that has not been fully studies in the economic literature. Specifically, this study extends Wu at al. (2004) in 
two important aspects. First, this study compares the relative efficiency of fertilizer-use taxes and three 
conservation easement policies (payments for conservation tillage, crop rotation and land retirements) for 
reducing nitrogen loads to the Mississippi River, while Wu et al. (2004) examine the effectiveness of payments 
for conservation tillage and crop rotation. Second, this study uses a state-of-art physical model to estimate NO3-N 
concentrations in the Mississippi River, while Wu et al. (2004) use simply environmental production functions to 
estimate NO3-N runoff beyond the root zone. Thus, this study should provide a better and more accurate measure 
of nitrate water pollution. 
 
The Study Region 
The Upper Mississippi River Basin (UMRB) encompasses approximately 480,000 square kilometers in six 
states: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and Wisconsin
1. The three major rivers in the UMRB are 
the Mississippi, the Minnesota, and the St. Croix. In this study, area above mouth of Missouri River, 
accounting for about 440,000 square kilometers, was used in this study. Thus, the UMRB is referred to as this 
area hereafter. 
  3In the most parts of the UMRB, agriculture is the dominant land use. The latest Natural Resource 
Inventory reports that nearly 70 percent of total land is used for agriculture and pasture. Corn, soybean, and 
alfalfa are the major crops planted in the basin. Corn and soybean covers 41 percent of total land and account 
for 59 percent of total cropland and pastureland in the basin. Major cropping practices are corn-soybean 
rotations and continuous corn, accounting for 62 percent and 6 percent of total cropland and pastureland 
respectively. Conventional tillage is a common tillage practice, accounting for 59 percent of total land planted 
to row crops (corn and soybean). In particular, 86 percent of continuous corn is produced using conventional 
tillage. Conservation tillage, such as no-till and reduced tillage, accounts for only 41 percent of cropland in the 
basin
2. About 3 percent of cropland enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). The annual rental 
rates range from $15.4 to $112.6, with an average of $78.3 in the basin. 
 
The Modeling Framework 
This section presents the integrated modeling framework to evaluate alternative policies for reducing nitrogen 
loads to surface water within the Upper Mississippi River Basin and Gulf of Mexico. The framework, 
illustrated in figure 2, is based upon the 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997 Natural Resource Inventories (NRI) - the 
most comprehensive surveys of soil, water, and related resources ever conducted in the United States. The NRI, 
conducted by the Natural Resource Conservation Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, is a 
scientifically based, longitudinal panel survey that contains information on nearly 800,000 sample sites across 
the continental United States. At each site, information on nearly 200 attributes is collected, including cropping 
history, soil properties, and agricultural land management practices. The NRI also contains an expansion factor 
to indicate the acreage each site represents. Thus, total acreage in the basin can be estimated by summing up 
the expansion factors for all sites in the basin. In the UMRB, there are a total of 101,893 sites, of which 44,229 
sites are located in agricultural land in 1997. 
Using the 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997 NRIs and economic data, the three econometric models are 
estimated to predict changes in land use and farming practices under alternative policies in the UMRB. These 
predicted changes are then fed into the physical model, the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT), to 
predict their impact on NO3-N concentrations in the Mississippi River. Results are spatially displayed by the 
GIS interface of the SWAT model. This integrated framework allows region-scale policy simulations while 
incorporating site-specific information. Below, we describe in details the economic and physical models of the 
framework. 
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Figure 1. The Modeling Framework 
The Economic models 
Three econometric models are developed to predict farmers’ decisions regarding: (1) the CRP participation; (2) 
crop choice; and (3) tillage practice. The CRP model predicts farmers’ decisions as to whether or not to 
participate in the CRP program at each NRI site in the UMRB. The crop choice model predicts farmers’ choice 
of crop at each NRI site (i.e. corn, soybean, hay, or other crop). The tillage model predicts farmers’ choice of 
tillage practices (conventional or conservation tillage) at each NRI site. Each model is specified as the logistic 
functional form to predict probabilities of choosing alternative land use options at each NRI site: 
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where   is the probability of choosing land use option i at NRI site j, and  Probij ij x  is a vector of independent 
variables affecting the farmer’s choice.
3
  5For the CRP model, the land use options are whether or not to participate in the CRP (i.e, I = 2).  The 
important variables affecting farmers’ CRP participation decisions include CRP rental rates and opportunity 
costs of participation. To measure the opportunity cost of participation, we include the following variables as 
independent variables in the model: a) expected revenue for corn production at the county level, b) variables 
measuring land quality at individual NRI sites such as land slope, erodibility, water holding capacity, organic 
matter percentage, soil pH, and soil permeability, c) variables measuring weather conditions and production 
risks such as the mean and variance of maximum temperature and precipitation during corn growing season, d) 
input prices, and e) state dummies reflecting differences in farming practices across states. 
For the crop choice model, the land use options are whether to grow corn, soybeans, hay, or “other 
crops” (i.e., I =4). The types of independent variables for the crop choice model include a) expected revenue 
and input prices for crop production at the county level; b) variables reflecting land quality and production 
costs at individual NRI sites, c) variables measuring weather conditions and production risks such as the mean 
and variance of maximum temperature and precipitation during corn growing season, and d) state dummies 
reflecting differences in farming practices across states. A detailed description of the crop choice and tillage 
models, similar to those used in this study, can be found in Wu at al. (2004).
4  
For the tillage model, the choice is whether or not to adopt conservation tillage (i.e., I=2). The key 
independent variable for the tillage model is the difference in production costs between conventional and 
conservation tillage. Other variables affecting tillage practices include weather and soil conditions because 
conservation tillage is more suitable for some soils and whether conditions than for others. For example, 
conservation tillage is not suited for: (a) poorly drained soils; (b) less fertile soils; and (c) steep and rough areas. 
Under those conditions, crop yields and profits under conservation tillage may be substantially lower than 
under conventional tillage. 
Three econometric models are used in the following order. First, the CRP model is used to predict the 
sites that will be enrolled in the CRP. Second, the crop choice model is applied to the non-CRP sites to predict 
the crop choice (corn, soybean, hay, or other crops) in 1998 and 1999. Based on the crop choice in these two 
years, crop rotations (corn-soybean rotations, continuous corn, hay, and other crop) at each site are determined. 
Third, if a site is predicted to be in corn-soybean rotation or continuous corn production, the tillage model is 
applied to predict the type of tillage operation (conventional tillage or conservation tillage). 
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The estimation of the three sets of econometric models requires a substantial amount of data, which must be 
integrated from multiple sources. These data include a) the choice of crop, tillage and CRP participation at 
each NRI site, b) farmers’ expected prices for inputs and outputs, c) expected yields, d) measures of production 
risks, e) site characteristics at each NRI point (soil properties, topographic features, climate conditions). 
Information on site characteristics is needed because we only have the county-level data on crop yields. Site 
characteristics are used to capture differences in land quality among the NRI sites. Below we provide a 
description of these data.  
Data on crop choice, tillage practice, and CRP participation at each NRI site are derived from the 
NRIs.  Each NRI contains crop choice information for four years (the current year plus the previous three 
years) and tillage information for one year. Information on CRP participation was collected only in the 1992 
and 1997 NRIs. Thus, we have crop choice information for sixteen years at each NRI site, tillage information 
for three years,
5 and CRP participation information for two years. Pooling these time-series and cross-sectional 
data results in 506,652 observations for the crop choice model (42,221 agricultural NRI sites x 12 years), 
126,663 observations for the tillage model (42,221 x 3), and 84,442 observations for the CRP model (42,221 x 
2). For computational feasibility, we randomly selected ten percent of the observations for the estimation of 
these models. 
The expected revenue for a crop in period t,  ( ) t R E , is estimated by 
(2)                                              () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t t t y p y p y E p E R E sd sd , ρ + =   
where   is the expected price,   is the expected yield, and  ( t p E ) () t y E ( ) t p sd  and   are standard 
deviation of the price and yield, respectively. 
() t y sd
ρ  is the correlation coefficient between the price and yield, 
which is assumed to be constant over the estimation period. The expected price is estimated using the futures 
price reported from the Chicago Board of Trade (CBT). Specifically, the first and second Thursday closing 
prices in March for December corn are averaged for each year. The expected value and the standard deviation 
of corn yield are estimated for each county using the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) county 
crop data for the period of 1975-1998. Using the data, a trend model of  ε β α + + = t y  is estimated for corn 
yields using the ordinary least square (Chavas and Holt 1990). The predicted value is taken as expected corn 
yield. The estimated residuals are then used to derive the standard deviation of corn yield, which reflects 
farmers’ risk in growing corn in each county. The standard deviation of corn price is estimated based on 
  7adaptive expectations following Chavas and Holt (1990). Specifically, the standard deviation of corn price in 
period t is given by 
(3)                                                   () () ()
5 . 0 2 3
1 1 sd ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − = ∑ = − − − − j j t j t j t j t p E p p ω
where   is the annual average market price for corn in period t-j,  j t p − ( ) j t j t p E − − − 1  is its expectation in the 
previous year. The year-specific weights  j ω , 0.5, 0.33, and 0.17 are also adapted from Chaves and Holt 
(1990). Because the expected revenues for corn and soybean are highly correlated, only the expected revenue 
for corn is included as independent variable. Also, the expected revenue for hay was statistically insignificant 
and was dropped from the final model. 
The CRP annual rental payments are obtained from the FSA. Time-series data on wage rate and 
fertilizer prices are obtained from the National Agricultural Statistic Service. All input and output prices, and 
the CRP rental rates are normalized by the index of prices paid by farmers, taken from the Agricultural 
Statistics. 
The NRI also contains information about land characteristics at each NRI site, which include land 
capacity class, slope, and erodibility index for wind and water erosion. Other site-specific characteristics such 
as water holding capacity, organic matter percentage, soil pH, and soil permeability are obtained by linking 
NRI to the SOIL5 database developed by the NRCS. Weather data are obtained from the Midwestern Regional 
Climate Center. Using historical weather information from the nearest weather station, the mean and standard 
deviation of maximum daily temperatures and precipitation during corn growing season are estimated. 
 
The Physical Model 
The Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) is used to assess the level of NO3-N concentrations in the 
Mississippi River under different policies. SWAT is a watershed (or river basin) scale water balance 
simulation model, developed by the Agricultural Research Service (ARS). SWAT can predict the impact of 
crop management practices on water, sediment, and agricultural chemical yields in large, complex watersheds 
with varying soils, land use, and management conditions over a long period of time (Neitsch et al). Because 
SWAT is a physically based model, no regression equation is used to describe the relationship between input 
and output variables. Instead, SWAT requires extensive information on topography, soil properties, weather, 
and land management practices in the watershed. The physical process associated with water movement, 
sediment and chemical transports, and crop growth are directly modeled by SWAT using collected information. 
  8The physically based approach has two desirable properties. First, watershed with no monitoring data (e.g. 
stream gage data) can be modeled. Secondly, the relative impact of alternative input data (e.g. changes in land 
management practices, climate, etc.) on water quality can be quantified (Neitsch et al.). This study cannot be 
completed without the second property. 
The spatial units of SWAT simulations are watershed and subbasins. The watershed is the overall 
hydrological unit, representing the entire area to be simulated. The watershed can be partitioned into a number 
of subbasins. Each subbasin possesses a geographic position in the watershed and is spatially related to 
adjacent subbasins. For example, outflow from subbasin #1 enters subbasin #3. Each subbasin is further 
divided into hydrologic response units (HRUs), which are virtual units of SWAT simulations. The 
geographical locations of HRUs within a subbasin are not specified. Each HRU represents a unique 
combination of land use and soil type. For example, if a subbasin has two land uses and two types of soil, 
SWAT will construct four HRUs for the subbasin, each HRU represents a unique combination of land use and 
soil class. The inclusion of HRUs enables SWAT to account for the complexity of the landscape within the 
subbasins. Thus, SWAT can take two levels of the spatial heterogeneity into account. The first level (subbasin) 
supports the spatial heterogeneity associated with hydrology, and the second level (HRU) incorporates the 
spatial heterogeneity associated with land use and soil type. Since the spatial heterogeneity significantly affects 
the levels of runoff, leaching, and the associated agricultural pollutants, SWAT is one of the best available 
tools for analyzing the issues related to agricultural land use changes and water pollution under spatially 
heterogeneous conditions. 
SWAT requires extensive information on the watershed, such as topography, land use and 
management, soil properties, and weather. Collected information are applied in three steps in the model 
development. These three steps include: (1) watershed delineation; (2) land use and soil classification; and (3) 
land management schedule descriptions. This study uses ArcView interface of SWAT 2000 (AVSWAT) to 
automate most of the model development steps. Detailed descriptions about these steps are documented in 
Anonymous (2004a, 2004b).
6  Delineated 118 subbasins, very close to USGS’s 8-digit hydrologic polygons, 
are presented in figure 8. 
 
Methods for Policy Evaluation 
Using the integrated modeling framework, we evaluate the relative efficiency of four commonly suggested 
policies for controlling hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico: (1) taxes on chemical fertilizer use; (2) incentive 
payments for cropland retirement; (3) incentive payments for conservation tillage; and (4) incentive payments 
  9for corn-soybean rotations. The evaluation is based on their social costs for achieving different levels of 
reduction in NO3-N concentrations in the Mississippi River. The impacts of these policies on crop choices, 
CRP participation, and rotation and tillage practices, and farm income are also estimated.  
To evaluate the impacts of the policies, we must first establish a baseline. To do this, we use the 
estimated models to predict farmer’s land use and management practices in 1998 and 1999. Specifically, by 
substituting the values of independent variables in 1998 and 1999 into the three econometric models, the 
probabilities of farmers’ choice of each land use option in 1998 and 1999 are calculated for each NRI point. 
The total acres of CRP, individual crops and conservation tillage in a region (e.g., a HRU) are then estimated 
using the following equations: 
(4)                                                      Prob( ) * CRP j j j A CRP xfactor =∑ , 
(5)                                                          Prob(  ) * ij j j A crop i xfactor =∑ , 
(6)             
1
Prob(  |   ) *Prob(   ) *
N
conserv j j j j
i
A conservation tillage crop i crop i xfactor
=
=∑∑ , 
where the summation for j is over all NRI sites within the region,   is the total CRP acres,   is the total 
acreage of crop i, and   is the total acreage under conservation tillage. 
CRP A i A
conserv A
Based on farmers’ crop choices at each NRI point in 1998 and 1999, the probabilities of adopting 
alternative cropping systems at each NRI site are estimated using the following formula: 
(7)                   
( -   ) (    98|      97)
* (    99|    98)
(    98|      97)





Prob corn bean rotation Prob corn in crop choice in
Prob soyb in corn in
Prob soyb in crop choice in




Based on the crop rotation at each NRI point, the acreage of land under a corn-soybean rotation is then 
estimated: 
(8)                                 Pr (corn-soyb rotation) * corn bean rotation j j j A ob xfactor − =∑ , 
Acres of continuous corn and continuous soybeans are estimated in a similar way. Based on the land use 
predictions for each HRU from equations (4)-(8), SWAT is then run to predict NO3-N concentrations in the 
Mississippi River. These estimates from econometric models and SWAT simulations serve as a baseline or 
reference for measuring the policy impacts. 
  10Once the baseline is established, the policy impact on land use can be evaluated. Some independent 
variables in the econometric models are “policy variables” because they are directly affected by policies. For 
example, policymakers can increase CRP participation by raising CRP rental payments. The effect of this 
policy is simulated by increasing CRP rental rates in the CRP model, holding other variables constant. 
Similarly, in the incentive payment programs for crop rotations, farmers who grow soybeans after corn or corn 
after soybean receive a payment. The effects of the payments are simulated by increasing the expected revenue 
for the eligible crops in the crop choice model (soybeans after corn or corn after soybean) by the amount of the 
payments. In the payment program for conservation tillage, farmers adopting conservation tillage receive a 
payment. The effect of this payment is simulated by increasing the difference between the production costs for 
conventional tillage and conservation tillage in the tillage model by the amount of the conservation payments. 
By setting the “policy variables” to a range of values, supply curves are generated for CRP acreage, crop 
rotation, and conservation tillage. These supply curves show acreages of adoption of conservation practice 
under different levels of incentive payments (see the curve above the horizontal axes in figure 2 for an 
illustration). Changes in land use are then translated into corresponding changes in NO3-N concentrations in 
the Mississippi River through SWAT simulations. Results are generated for percentage reductions in NO3-N 
concentrations (simulated 20-year average) under the different levels of adoption of conservation practice (see 
the curve below the horizontal axes in figure 2). 
 



























Figure 2. Measuring Social Costs for Reducing NO3-N Concentrations 
  11Social cost for achieving different levels of reduction in NO3-N concentrations can be estimated based 
on the estimated the relationships between payment levels, adoption rates, and percentage reductions in NO3-N 
concentrations. Specifically, for each targeted level of reduction in NO3-N concentrations, the required 
adoption level can be determined based the relationship between adoption rates and percentage reductions in 
NO3-N concentrations (i.e., the curve below the horizontal axis in figure 2). The corresponding payment level 
is then determined based the supply curve of conservation practice (i.e., the curve above the horizontal axis in 
figure 2). For example, as shown in figure 2, a C% reduction in NO3-N concentration requires   acres of 
land adopting the conservation practice. The corresponding payment rate required is $ . The area under the 
supply curve between the vertical axes and the required adoption level in figure 2 (i,e., the shaded area) is the 
social cost for achieving the targeted level of reduction in NO
C A
C P
3-N concentration.  
Social costs for achieving different level of reduction in NO3-N concentrations under the fertilizer-
use tax are estimated using the following procedure. First, we estimate crop choice at each NRI site for 
different tax rates τ  by changing the fertilizer price in the crop choice model. Second, we estimate the 
fertilizer application rate for corn by using  0 () ( 1 ) NN
ε τ τ
− =+ , where   is the nitrogen application rate 
without any tax, 
0 N
τ  is the tax rate, and ε  is the own price elasticity of nitrogen application rate. We set  = 
201 Kg pa
0 N
-1 based on suggestions from a researcher at the Soil and Water Conservation Society and data from 
Iowa Agricultural Experimental Station, and ε  = -0.21 based on a study of demand for nitrogen fertilizer in 
corn production in the U.S. Midwest by Denabaly and Vroomen (1993). Third, based on the estimated crop 
choice and nitrogen application rates, we rerun SWAT to estimate the NO3-N concentrations in the Mississippi 
River under different levels of taxes. Fourth, we calculate aggregate farm profit under different tax rates using  
(9)                                          [] {}
1
() ( () ) ( 1 ) ()
I
ii i i i i
i
Ap Y N C w N τ ττ
=
−− + ∑ τ  
where  () i A τ  is the total acreage planted to crop i under the tax   is the price for crop i,  i p (( ) ) ii YNτ  is the 
yield of crop i under the fertilizer tax, and   is the production cost of producing crop i except the nitrogen 
fertilizer. 
i C
() i A τ  is estimated from the crop choice model and (5). Corn yields under different levels of 
nitrogen application rates  (( ) ) ii YNτ  are taken from Stecker et al (1995), who estimate quadratic yield 
response functions to nitrogen application rates for continuous corn and corn-soybean rotation. Yields for other 
crops are assumed not to be affected by the tax. Production costs   are estimated based on Duffy (2000). All  i C
  12prices and yields except corn are obtained from the National Agricultural Statistic Service (2001). Finally, 
Social costs for achieving different levels of reduction in NO3-N concentrations are estimated by subtracting 
the tax revenue from farmers’ profit loss under the corresponding level of tax. 
  
Results 1: The Relative Efficiency of the Four Conservation Policies 
Land Use Changes under the Policies 
The policy impacts on land use and farming practices in the UMRB are evaluated using the three sets of 
econometric models. Figure 3 presents the estimated effects of the fertilizer-use tax on cropland allocation. The 
predicted acreages of corn, soybean, and hay at the baseline closely match the acreages reported in the 1997 
NRI. Under this policy, corn and soybean acreages decrease as the tax rate increases, while hay and other crop 
acreages increase simultaneously. This result is as expected because corn and soybeans are chemical-intensive 
crops, whereas hay and other small crops in the region are not. Also as expected, corn acreage is more 
responsive to the tax than soybean acreage, because corn requires more fertilizer application than soybeans. 
Overall, farmers are responsive to this tax; as the tax rate increases, farmers switch more “polluting” crops (i.e. 











































Figure 3. Estimated Acreage Responses to the Fertilizer-Use Tax 
In the Upper Mississippi River Basin 
Figure 4 shows the estimated effects of CRP rental rates on CRP acreage in the UMRB. As the rental 
rate increases, the acres of cropland enrolled in CRP also increase, but the rate of increase is not constant. 
Acreage responses are inelastic when the rental rate is below $100 or between $200 and $250, but elastic when 
the rental rate is between $100 and $200 or above $250 per acre.  Most of land enrolled in the CRP from $100-
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Figure 4. Estimated Supply Function of CRP Land 
in the Upper Mississippi River Basin 
 
responsive when the payment level is below $250 per acre. At the rental rate of $250, nearly 18 million acres 
(25 percent of cropland) is enrolled in CRP, but most of land enrolled was planted to “non-polluting crops” (i.e. 
hay and other crops). This suggests that required payments for CRP participation are higher than profit forgone 
because the average net return from corn and soybean production in the U.S. is estimated to be only $110 per 
acre in 1998 (Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute 1999). Higher rental rates may be necessary for 
at least two reasons. First, although the CRP provides cost-share assistance to participating farmers who 
establish resource-conserving cover on their CRP land, this assistance covers only up to 50 percent of the 
participants’ costs. Data obtained from the Farm Service Agency (2003) indicates that CRP participants 
receive $145 dollars per acre on average for cost-share assistance and incentive payments. Second, when CRP 
contracts expire, some farmers may want to bring their CRP land back into crop production. The conversion 
cost could be substantial especially when trees were planted as a land covers. Farmers may not be willing to 
participate if these conversion and establishment costs are covered. 
Figure 5 depicts the estimated effects of incentive payments for conservation tillage in the UMRB.  
Farmers are very responsive to this policy. At the baseline, 40% of corn and soybean acres are adopting 
conservation tillage. A payment rate of $50 and $100 per acre increases the share of conservation tillage to 61 
and 78 percent of corn and soybean acres, respectively. The large variation in the required payment level for 
conservation tillage may reflect that conservation tillage may be more suitable for some soils than for others.  
In general, conservation tillage is not suited for: (a) poorly drained soils; (b) less fertile soils; and (c) steep and 
rough areas. Under those conditions, crop yields and profits under conservation tillage may be substantially 
  14lower than under conventional tillage. In addition, conservation tillage requires special equipments such as a 
no-till planter and shielded sprayer. It also requires timely weed control, which some farmers, especially past-
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Figure 5. Estimated Acreage Responses to Incentive Payments for Conservation Tillage 
in the Upper Mississippi River Basin 
In studying conservation tillage adoption in Iowa, Kurkalova, Kling and Zhao (2003) find that a 30 
percent increase in conservation tillage can be achieved with a payment of $11 per acre.  Our estimates of 
required payments for the UMRB are higher; a payment of $33 per acre is required for a 30 percent increase in 
conservation tillage in the UMRB. The difference may be due to two reasons.  First, in Kurkalova, Kling and 
Zhao (2003), payments are offered for all crops adopting conservation tillage, while payments in this study are 
only offered for corn and soybean.  Second, the adoption rate of conservation tillage has been historically 
higher in Iowa than any other states in the UMRB. The 1992 NRI indicates that conservation tillage acreage 
accounts for 61 percent of cropland in Iowa, but only 21 percent in other five states (Illinois, Indiana, 
Minnesota, Missouri, and Wisconsin). 
Figure 6 presents the estimated effects of incentive payments for corn-soybean rotations. This policy 
rewards farmers who plant corn after soybeans, or soybeans after corn. The effects are simulated by raising the 
expected revenue for the eligible crops (corn after soybean or soybean after corn) in the crop choice model.  
Currently, 86 percent of corn and soybean acreage is under corn-soybean rotation. A payment of $50, $100, 
and $150 per acre increases the share to 88, 90, and 94 percent, respectively. Given that 86 percent of corn and 
soybean acreage is already under corn-soybean rotation, this policy is not likely to have a large impact on NO3-
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Figure 6. Estimated Acreage Responses to Incentive Payments for Corn-Soybean Rotation 
in the Upper Mississippi River Basin 
SWAT Model Validation and Results 
Using the land use data at the baseline, a 20-year run of the SWAT model is conducted. The monthly averages 
of the simulated stream flow are compared with the monthly average of measured stream flow from 1980 to 
1999 at the USGS stream gage station on the Mississippi River in the town of Grafton, Illinois (figure 7). 
Although the model tends to underpredict in late winter and early spring, and overpredict in early winter, this 
divergence can be explained by the difference in the measured and simulated levels of precipitation. Overall, 
SWAT predicts the stream flow reasonably well. In addition, the difference between the measured and 













































Figure 7. Monthly Average of Measured and Simulated Streamflow of 
the Mississippi River at Grafton, IL (R
2=0.59) 
  16The simulated NO3-N concentrations are also compared with measured NO3-N concentrations at the 
USGS stream gage station near Grafton, Illinois. SWAT predicts an annual average of NO3-N concentrations 
of 1.99 milligram per liter (mg/L), accounting for 64 percent of total concentrations of 3.14 mg/L.
7 Goolsby 
and Battaglin (2003) reports that commercial nitrogen fertilizer and legume nitrogen fixing contribute 65 
percent of total nitrogen inputs in Mississippi River Basin above Missouri River. Because other major nitrogen 
inputs, such as livestock manure, human domestic waste, and industrial point source discharges, are not 
included in this study, NO3-N concentrations simulated by the SWAT model is quite consistent with the study 
by Goolsby and Battaglin. 
 
Figure 8. Estimated NO3-N Concentration at the End of Reach in Each Subbasin 
in the Upper Mississippi River Basin 
  17Figure 8 shows the simulated NO3-N concentrations at the end of reaches in each subbasin in the 
UMRB. The level of concentrations range from 0.18 to 2.1 mg/L, with a basin average of 0.7 mg/L. High NO3-
N concentrations tend to occur along the mainstream of the Mississippi River and its major tributaries. In the 
upper area of the basin, particularly high concentrations are predicted in subbasins 111 and 23. These 
subbasins have intensive row crop production and higher precipitations than the basin average. Lower 
concentrations occurs at many subbasins below these subbasins due mainly to less intensive row crop 
production. In the UMRB, the highest concentrations occur in subbasin 90, the confluence of the Mississippi 
River and the Des Moines River. The subbasins along the Des Moines River have high concentrations of row 
crop production (mostly corn and soybean) and have been identified as a high-risk area of NO3-N water 
pollution in the UMRB. Previous water quality surveys show that NO3-N concentrations in the public water 
supply in Des Moines, Iowa, often exceed the maximum contamination level of 10 mg/L set by the EPA 
(USGS 2003). 
 
The Relative Efficiency of the Four Policies 
Social costs to achieve different levels of reduction in NO3-N concentrations in the Mississippi River under 
each of the four policies are shown in figure 9. The fertilizer-use tax is estimated to be most cost-effective for 
reducing NO3-N concentrations in the Mississippi River among the four policies. This result reflects that 
acreage of polluting crops (corn and soybean) is more responsive to the tax than to the three payment policies. 
In addition, this policy reduces the amount of fertilizer application. In contrast, the CRP is the least cost-
effective for reducing NO3-N concentrations in the Mississippi River. Although the CRP can be used to 
achieve a large reduction in NO3-N concentrations in this river, it has to enroll the non-polluting crops first. 
Our results show that few acres of polluting crops will be enrolled in the CRP when the rental rate is below 
$250 per acre in the basin. 
Among the three conservation easements, incentive payments for conservation tillage are most cost-
effective for reducing NO3-N concentrations in the Mississippi River. Although the payment is less cost-
effective than the fertilizer-use tax, the social cost under this policy is significantly lower than those under the 
other two conservation easements. It should be noted, however, that this policy can reduce NO3-N 
concentrations by no more than 37 percent. At this level, all cropland under conventional tillage has already 
been converted to conservation tillage. 
Finally, our results suggest that incentive payments for corn-soybean rotations can reduce NO3-N 
concentrations up to only 6 percent in this basin. Further reduction is not possible because, at this level, all 
  18continuous corn has already been converted to corn-soybean rotation. Such a small effect on stream water 















































Figure 9. Estimated Social Costs for Reducing NO3-N Concentrations 
in the Upper Mississippi River Under the Four Policies 
Results 2: The Relative Efficiency of the Targeted and Uniform Taxes 
Results reported in previous section show that the uniform fertilizer-use tax is much more cost-effective than 
any of conservation payments for reducing NO3-N concentrations in the Mississippi River. However, results 
does consider other tax policies, such as a targeted fertilizer-use tax. The extent to which a targeted tax 
outperforms a uniform tax is in dispute. Claassen and Horan (2001) find that the targeted tax significantly 
outperforms the uniform tax under spatially heterogeneous conditions. In contrast, Helfand and House (1995) 
find that the uniform tax is almost as cost-effective as the targeted tax. Our second integrated model evaluates 
the relative efficiency of the targeted and uniform taxes for reducing NO3-N surface loads using the integrated 
modeling framework To facilitate our analysis, this section focuses on the Des Moines Watershed, simulated 
to be the most NO3-N polluted watershed in the UMRB.
8
Although the second integrated model follows basically our first model, we made several changes in 
the physical model to enhance the accuracy of SWAT simulation. First, land use information is derived from 
the National Land Cover Dataset (NLCD) instead of the LULC. The NLCD is a 30-meter resolution raster land 
cover for the entire United States. The NLCD provides detailed land use for agriculture (row crop and hay), 
forest, wetland, urban, and other land uses. Second, land management scenarios for polluting crops 
(continuous corn and corn-soybean rotation) incorporates the split nitrogen applications. Third, we obtained 
the daily values of maximum and minimum daily temperature and precipitation from Iowa Environmental 
  19Mesonet. Thus, the SWAT simulation is based on historical climatic conditions rather than randomly generated 
climatic variables 
 
SWAT Model Validation and Results 
Using the land use information under the baseline scenario, the SWAT model is run for the period of 1988-
1999. Simulated monthly average streamflow is compared to measured values reported from the USGS stream 
gage station on the Des Moines River in Ottumwa, Iowa (figure 10). Overall performance of the SWAT 
prediction is quite reasonable (R
2=0.88). Although the model overpredict during post- and pre-harvesting 
seasons, the difference between the simulated and measured annual average streamflow is less than 4 percent. 
The model's prediction is particularly well for the period of 1999 (R
2=0.95). Thus, we use the values predicted 








































Figure 10. Simulated and Observed Streamflow in the Des Moines River  
at Ottumwa, Iowa 1998-99 (R
2 = 0.88) 
Table 1 shows the average annual NO3-N runoff from different land use. The level of runoff from land 
planted to row crops is generally high. Particularly high levels of runoff are predicted from land adopting 
conventional tillage, estimated to be 4.4 Kg ha
-1 and 2.7 Kg ha
-1 from continuous corn and corn-soybean 
rotation, respectively. NO3-N runoff from the land adopting conservation tillage are generally lower, 2.2 Kg 
ha
-1 and 1.0 Kg ha
-1 from continuous corn and corn-soybean rotation, respectively. The model estimates that 
NO3-N runoff from continuous corn is 122 percent higher than corn-soybean rotation. This difference may be 
due to fertilizer management. Continuous corn production requires the application of nitrogen fertilizer every 
year, nitrogen fertilizer is usually applied every other year under corn-soybean rotation (i.e. fertilizer is applied 
  20only when corn is planted). NO3-N runoff from hay and other crops is the lowest among alternative cropping 
systems. This is expected because hay and other crops do not require nitrogen application. Thus, the only 
source of NO3-N runoff is nitrogen fixation. Overall, NO3-N runoff from row crops is estimated to be 30 times 
higher than hay and other crop, which is consistent with the prior literature. For example, Randall et al. (1997) 
report that NO3-N runoff from row crops is 30 to 50 times higher than from the perennial crops. 
 
Table 1. Predicted NO3-N Runoff Under Different Agricultural Land Use  
in the Des Moines Watershed (Kg ha
-1) 
Subbasin
L a n d  u s e 5 15 26 06 56 66 98 1 1 0 3 1 0 4 A v e r a g e
Corn-soybean - CT 2.3 2.9 3.0 3.9 2.4 2.6 1.2 2.3 3.5 2.6
Corn-soybean - NT 1.3 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.1
Continuous corn - CT 4.2 4.6 4.2 5.8 4.1 4.4 1.7 4.3 6.6 4.1
Continuous corn - NT 2.7 1.5 1.9 3.2 2.2 1.8 0.9 2.3 2.9 2.0
Hay and pasture 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
A v e r a g e 2 . 12 . 02 . 12 . 92 . 02 . 00 . 92 . 02 . 8 2 . 0
 
 
Table 1 also shows a considerable difference in NO3-N runoff among 9 subbasins in the Des Moines 
Watershed. The predicted runoff ranges from 0.9 Kg ha
-1 to 2.9 Kg ha
-1. The highest runoff is predicted in 
subbasin 65, in which row crops are intensively planted In addition, annual precipitation in this subbasin is 
higher than any other subbasins in the watershed. In contrast, the lowest NO3-N runoff is predicted in the 
subbasin 81, in which row crop production is less intensive. Furthermore, annual precipitation in this subbasin 
is lower than watershed average. Overall, high levels of NO3-N runoff are predicted in the middle of the 
watershed, and low levels of runoff are estimated in the upper and lower areas of the watershed. This spatial 
variation can be mainly explained by cropping patterns and precipitation. 
The high degree of variation in NO3-N runoff is particularly interesting. Because it is assumed that 
farmers in the watershed treat their lands uniformly for given land use, variation in NO3-N runoff is due to the 
physical attributes and operational characteristics (e.g. soil properties, land slope, weather conditions, and 
cropping patterns). Thus, the estimated variation in NO3-N runoff can be viewed as a degree of spatial 
heterogeneity in the watershed. In this context, spatial heterogeneity in the Des Moines Watershed is 
considerable, implying a significant efficiency gain from the targeted fertilizer-use tax. 
 
 
  21The Relative Efficiency of the Fertilizer-Use Taxes 
Figure 11 illustrates derivation of optimal tax rates under the targeted policy. For simplicity, it is assumed that 
there are two subbasins in the watershed. The curves ML1 and ML2 represent marginal profit loss for reducing 
NO3-N runoff from subbasin 1 and 2, respectively. The aggregate supply of NO3-N runoff reduction is given 
by the horizontal summation of these two curves. Assume that the policymaker wishes to reduce NO3-N runoff 
by R  in the watershed. To minimize the aggregate farm profit loss,   and   are the levels of NO 1 R 2 R 3-N 
runoff reduction for subbasin 1 and 2, respectively. In the lower figure,   and   are the curves representing 
the relationship between the tax rate and corresponding NO
1 S 2 S
3-N runoff reduction for subbasin 1 and 2. To 







Figure 11. Optimal Tax Rates Under the Targeted Fertilizer-Use Tax 
Table 2 shows the optimal tax rates for each of 9 subbasins under the targeted fertilizer-use tax. Under 
this policy, the highest tax rate is imposed on subbasin 65, and the lowest for subbasin 81 to achieve each of 
NO3-N runoff reduction targets. SWAT model predicts that subbasin 65 has the highest NO3-N runoff potential 
(2.9 Kg ha
-1), and thus more likely to contribute to water pollution than any other subbasins in the watershed. 
In contrast, subbasin 81 is predicted to have the lowest NO3-N runoff potential (0.9 Kg ha
-1), and thus less 
  22likely to contribute to water pollution. Overall, the variation of tax rates among subbasins is quite consistent 
with the variation of NO3-N runoff. The tax rates under the targeted policy are generally lower than the 
uniform policy, except three subbasins with high NO3-N runoff potentials. 
 
Table 2. Optimal Tax Rates Under the Targeted and Uniform Polices 
     NO3-N Runoff Reduction From the Watershed (%)
10 20 30 40 50
Uniform tax (%) 83 149 173 194 205
Targeted tax (%) Subbasin
51 66 118 142 160 176
52 67 120 140 166 180
60 84 151 183 202 218
65 92 164 195 214 232
66 75 135 165 180 198
69 63 113 138 153 169
81 51 92 117 137 143
103 57 102 126 141 156
104 88 163 191 212 231
 
 
Table 3 presents the farm profit loss for each subbasin under the targeted and uniform fertilizer-use 
taxes to reduce NO3-N runoff by 30 percent. It is shown that 6 out of 9 subbasins in the Des Moines Watershed 
are better off under the targeted policy. In particular, subbasin 81 and 103 reduce profit loss substantially, by 
more than 100 percent. In contrast, 3 out of 9 subbasins in the watershed are worse off under the targeted 
policy. These subbasins are predicted to have high NO3-N runoff potentials, and thus high tax rates are 
imposed under the targeted policy. Overall, the efficiency gain under the targeted fertilizer-use tax is 
considerably high. The difference in the aggregate farm profit loss between the targeted and uniform policies is 
estimated to be 30 percent. 
Table 3. Aggregate Farm Profit Loss Under the Targeted and Uniform Taxes  
for 30 percent NO3-N Runoff Reduction in the Des Moines Watershed 
Profit loss              NO3-N runoff reduction
Subbasin Uniform Targeted Difference (%) Uniform Targeted Difference (%)
51 690,613 463,583 -49.0 119,946 87,333 -37.3
52 506,758 297,157 -70.5 126,231 81,437 -55.0
60 448,661 503,115 10.8 33,262 76,607 56.6
65 540,703 641,795 15.8 136,932 218,327 37.3
66 817,761 749,916 -9.0 103,256 89,626 -15.2
69 663,541 334,561 -98.3 79,371 28,269 -180.8
81 710,933 233,882 -204.0 74,224 27,711 -167.9
103 981,213 359,140 -173.2 136,039 55,735 -144.1
104 1,049,321 1,366,796 23.2 428,496 572,607 25.2
Watershed 6,409,505 4,949,945 -29.5 1,237,759 1,237,651 0.0  
  23Finally, figure 12 draws two curves representing the relationship between the NO3-N reduction and 
aggregate farm profit loss under the targeted and uniform taxes in the Des Moines Watershed. Although the 
difference in the aggregate farm profit loss between two policies is small when the reduction target is low, 
profit loss under the targeted policy is significantly smaller than uniform policy when the reduction target is 
more than 20 percent. To reduce runoff from the watershed by 30 to 50 percent, the differences in profit loss 
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Figure 12. Aggregate Farm Profit Loss Under the Targeted and Uniform Taxes 
in the Des Moines Watershed 
Conclusions 
This study integrates economic and physical models to estimate the social costs for reducing NO3-N 
concentrations in the Upper Mississippi River Basin under four commonly suggested policies for controlling 
hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico. The economic models predict three land use decisions (CRP participation, crop 
choice and rotation, and conservation tillage adoption) at more than 44,000 National Resource Inventory sites 
in the Upper Mississippi River Basin under the four policies. The physical model then estimates the effect of 
land use decisions on NO3-N concentrations in the Mississippi River. 
Results from our first empirical application suggest that the fertilizer-use tax is much more cost-
effective than the three conservation easement policies. Among the three conservation easement policies, 
payments for conservation tillage are most cost-effective but can reduce NO3-N concentrations up to only 37 
percent. The potential for incentive payments for corn-soybean rotations is even more limited. These payments 
also impose a higher cost to society than the payments for conservation tillage. The Conservation Reserve 
Program can be used to achieve the highest reduction in NO3-N concentrations, but it also imposes the highest 
  24cost to the society among the four policies considered in this study. Results from our second empirical 
application show that the targeted fertilizer-use tax is much more cost-effective than the targeted tax for 
reducing NO3-N loadings. 
The 2002 Farm Bill represents a significant commitment of resources to conservation by reauthorizing 
and expanding the exiting conservation programs and by establishing new conservation programs. Some of 
these programs have been criticized as political payments. However, there was little empirical evidence that 
these programs are cost effective compared with other commonly suggested policy instruments for controlling 
nonpoint source pollution. Findings from this study suggest that a simple fertilizer-use tax is much more cost 
effective than several commonly suggested approaches for reducing nitrate water pollution within the 
Mississippi River Basin and for controlling hypoxia problem in the Gulf of Mexico. However, political 
difficulties of instituting such a tax cannot be prohibitive. Ultimately, policy makers must balance economic 





                                                 
1 Although the Upper Mississippi River Basin also includes small parts of North and South Dakota, these areas 
are not included in this study. 
2 Conservation tillage refers to any tillage operation, which leaves at least 30 percent of crop residue after 
harvesting. Any tillage operation leaving less than 15 percent of crop residue is classified as conventional 
tillage. 
3 This type of logistic models have been widely used in economic analysis, including the study of the choice of 
transportation modes, occupations, asset portfolios, and the number of automobiles demanded. In agriculture, 
it has been used to model farmers’ land allocation decisions (Lichtenberg; Wu and Segerson; Hardie and 
Parks; Plantinga, Mauldin, and Miller), the choice of irrigation technologies (Caswell and Zilberman), and 
the choice of alternative crop management practices (Wu and Babcock, 1998). 
4 The main difference between the crop choice model used in this study and the one in Wu at al. (2004) is that 
here we include input prices such as nitrogen fertilizer prices and wage rate as independent variables rather 
than total production cost to facilitate the evaluation of nitrogen fertilizer use taxes. 
5 The 1997 NRI data used here contained crop information, but not tillage information. 
6 Both Anonymous (2004a) and (2004b) is available upon request. 
7 Our first integrated model compares the simulated NO3-N concentrations with measured concentrations using 
annual  average values, not monthly averages, to facilitate our region-scale SWAT analysis. Land 
management scenarios in our SWAT model assume that farmers apply fertilizer (anhydrous ammonia) in 
early spring only, whereas many farmers in the region apply fertilizers more than once as insurance for 
unexpected weather events. Thus, although the first model simulates annual average NO3-N concentrations 
reasonably, it may not be true for monthly averages. The second integrated model overcomes this limitation. 
8 The Des Moines Watershed consists of 9 subbasins in figure 8. Those include subbasins 51, 52, 60, 65, 66, 69, 
81, 103, and 104. 
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